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5233. In Bank. Oct. 
In re ROBERT C. MciNTURFF, on Habeas 
[1] Delinquent Children-Youth Correction.-Undcr the Youth 
Act as it existed in 1943, it was that 
the trial court who came within 
Welf. & Inst. § 1731.5, subds. (a) , to the Youth 
for its determination whether it would com-
mitment of such and refusal to them could 
be corrected on 
[2] Id.- Youth Correction._,_ Trial court's failure to 
offender to the Youth Authority at a time 
& Inst. § required it to do so may be 
sense that, if the circumstances are 
the writ of prohibition may issue to 
action, or the writ of certiorari to 
failure of a court to proceed in the manner 
not an act in excess of jurisdiction in the 
habeas corpus will liP. 
[3] Habeas Corpus-Existence of Another Remedy-Appeal.-
\Vhere is held under a judgment which has become 
and there is no lack of jurisdiction in the strict sense 
no constitutional question, and the question sought to 
could have been and was not appeal, 
corpus should not lie. 
[4] Delinquent Children-Youth Correction-Habeas Corpus.-
IIabea;;; corpus of con-
See 13 Cal.Jur. 218 
McK. Dig. References: 
Habeas § 12. 
§ 31 
877 
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Sacra-
mento granting a writ of habeas corpus. Raymond 
'l'. Coughlin, Judge. Reversed. 
Pred N. Howser and Edmund G. 
era!, Clarence A. Linn ami Gail A. Strader, Deputy 
General, for Appellant. 
Oscar A. Kistle, Public Defender (Sacramento) and Thomas 
\V. Olson, Jr., Assistant Public Defender, for Hespondent. 
SCHAUER, ,J.-The superior court, in this habeas corpus 
proceeding, determined that petitioner was unlawfully con-
fined in the state prison at Polsom and ordered that he be 
discharged. The People appeaL The question is whether the 
writ of habeas corpus is available, after final judgment of con-
Yiction and sentence, to review the trial court's erroneous 
refusal to certify petitioner to the Youth Authority. We have 
concluded that the writ cannot be used for this purpose. 
Petitioner is confined under a judgment of conviction of 
first degree robbery. At the time of his apprehension for the 
offense petitioner was 18 years of age. \Vhen he came before 
the trial court for sentence in 1943, that court denied 
petitioner's request to be referred to the Youth Authority 
and sentenced him to state for the term prescribed 
by law. 
'l'he Youth Authority Act as it read at the time petitioner 
committed the crime and at the time he was sentenced pro-
vided, ''a court shall commit to the Authority any person 
convicted of a public offense whom the Authority believes can 
be materially benefited by the procedure herein provided for, 
and for whose care and maintenance there exists, in the opin-
ion of the Authority, proper and adequate facilities, and who 





in which the word 
of or certiorari is 
under consideration. (See Redlands lL Seh. Dist. v. 
, 20 CaL2d 360 P.2d .) And the 
habeas corpus has been of that 
The broadened uses of habeas 
corpus the 
situations in which it is available to reYiew matters over which 
the trial court had " ' rather than 
the of ' In Bell (1942), 19 
CaL2d 493~494 P.2d ; In 1·e 111cYieket·s (1946), 
29 Cal.2d 264, 273 [176 P.2d 40]; In re (1946), 29 
CaL2cl 294, 296 [176 P.2d .) 'rherefore, no 1Jseful purpose 
would be serYed discussion of whether the error here was 
' or ''n1ere.'' 
[3] Whe1·e, as the petitioner is held under a judg-
ment which has become final, and there is no lack of jurisdic~ 
tion in the strict sense and no constitutional question, the fol-
lowing considerations are to the determination 
whether relief by habeas corpus is available : If the question 
sought to be presented eould have been and was not presented 
by appeal, ordinarilrhabeas corpus should not lie. (See In re 
Connor (1940), 16 Cal.2d 701,706 [108 P.2d 10].) Without 
this usual limitation of the usc of the writ, judgments of con-
·dction of crime would haYe only a semblance of finality. But 
there are some situations where habeas corpus can be used to 
the relief sought without going' behind the judgment of 
conviction and without opening up questions of fact which 
are difficult of solution. For example, relief can be given to 
a person held under S(mtencc to an institution or custodian 
other than the one authorized by law (In 1~e Wilson ( 1925), 
196 Cal. 525 [238 P, 359]; Pen. Code, 1486, 1487, 
snbd. , 1493, ] 501 , to one upon whom the wrong type of 
sentence has been imposed (In re Lee (1918), 177 Cal. 690, 
696 [171 P. [indeterminate sentence imposed when peti-
tioner should have been sentenced to a fixed term; petitioner 
remanded for sentence] ) , and to one whose commitment for 
punishment as an habitual criminal has been founded upon 
facts which as a matter of law do not admit of sueh punish-
ment (In 1'1' Me Vickers (1946) supra, 2H Cal.2d 264, 274; 
In 1'C , supra, 29 Oal.2d 294, 303). Also, and 
similarly, the writ may be used to discharge one whose sen-
tence for a term of years JS than that authorized by 
881 
law, where the valid 
In Jlfm'ck , 180 CaL :~84 
In each these instances determinations which were un~ 
law and which affected were cor~ 
where the 
!'Onrt at its 
dPtermination in the circumstances. 
case the unauthorized determination should 
not bt> referred to the Youth Authority) was one which might 
or might not have affected punishment. .At this late date we 
<~annot presume discharging petitioner in 
require us to presume) that had petitioner been referred to 
the Youth Authority that hody vvould have found that he was 
a proper subject for its control and that it had facilities to 
accept him, and that the Authority would have discharged 
him when or before he reached the age of 25 years. Nor do 
we think it proper to require that petitioner be retroactively 
certified to the Authority for that body's speculative deter-
mination as to what it would have done had petitioner been 
referred to it at the proper time. To reopen to speculative 
review the cases of prisoners who were not referred to the 
Authority during the period when such referral was both 
mandatory and possible, whether or not those prisoners are 
now of such age that they could be subject to control of the 
Authority, would not accord with the general principle of 
finality of judgments. For the reasons above stated, In re 
Rug land (1947) ,supra, 80 Cal.App.2d 316, 317, is disapproved. 
In accord with our position here is the position taken in 
the following cases which considered the effect of the trial 
eourt 's failure to comply with the of the Juvenile 
Court Law that defendants under a certain age be certified 
to the juvenile court for its determination whether they should 
be proceeded against as juveniles or tried as adults: In re 
'Porn (1911), 17 CaLApp. 678, 680 [121 P. 294]; People v. 
Oxnant (1915), 170 CaL 211, 217-218 [149 P. 165]; In re 
Northon (1917), 35 Cal.App. 369, 371 [169 P. 1051]; In re 
Wolff ( 1920), 183 CaL 602 [192 P. ; People v. Barbera 
(1926), 78 Cal.App. 277, 279 P. 304]; In re Downs 
(1928), 95 CaLApp. 571, 573 [273 P. 143]; People v. Lttzo-
~vich (1932), 127 CaLApp. 465, 468 [16 P.2d 144]; People v. 
Sanchez (1942), 21 Cal.2d466, 471 [132 P.2d 810]. The cases 
of In re rl'assey (1927), 81 CaLApp. 287, 293 [253 P. 948]; 
In re Bast·iani (1927), 81 Cal.App. 294 [253 P. 951]; and 
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